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Abstract
Lloyd Humberstone’s recently published Philosophical Applications of
Modal Logic [5] presents a number of new ideas in modal logic as well
explication and critique of recent work of many others. In this note
we extend some of these ideas and answer some questions that are left
open in the book. Numbers without other identification refer to pages
in that book.
1 Local and Global Conditions
One theme sounded frequently in [5] is the relation between a local condition,
which describes a point in a frame and a global condition, which concerns the
frame as a whole. For example, the local conditions of being reflexive (Rxx)
and being reflexive with reflexive successors (Rxx ∧ ∀y(Rxy → Ryy)) are
distinct, but their universal possession by the points in a frame describes the
same global condition of reflexivity. As a consequence, the non-equivalent
modal axioms 2p → p and (2p → p) ∧ 2(2q → q) both define the class
of reflexive frames. This example leads Humberstone to ask (189) whether
there is a local property not implying that a point possessing it is reflexive
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2whose universal possession makes the frame reflexive. Affirmative answers
are supplied by the following formulas: ∀y(y=x∧Rxx)∨(∃y(y 6= x)∧∀y(y 6=
x → Ryy)) (either x is the only world and it is reflexive or else there are
other worlds, all of which are reflexive), and ∃zRxz∧∀z(Rzx→ Rzz) (x has
a successor and every world that can see x is reflexive). The second example
implies that the tense-logical formulas F> ∧H(Gp→ p) and Gp→ p both
define the class of reflexive frames.
2 Fully Modalized Logics
Another topic that gets well-deserved attention in [5] is the property of logics
that Humberstone calls being “fully modalized.” (See 290-304.) The idea
is that in alethic modal systems the axiom 2A→ A provides a logical con-
nection between the modal and nonmodal formulas, whereas in a doxastic
or deontic logic we expect that matters concerning what is believed or what
ought to be the case should be logically independent of those concerning
what is the case. The latter, but not the former, are fully modalized. But
the idea needs to formulated with some care because we don’t want the pres-
ence of, for example, A→ 2> as a theorem to count against a logic’s being
fully modalized. As Humberstone puts it, in a fully modalized logic, “. . . we
don’t expect. . . the forging of any. . . logical connections between 2A and A
for any given A – other than those which hold. . . derivatively” (291). The
notion is captured in a rather complicated way by E. Zolin in [13] and Hum-
berstone shows that the characterization there is equivalent to the following
simpler one: if there is a theorem of the form M ∨ N where M is a fully
modalized formula (i.e., containing no sentence letters not within the scope
of a modal operator) and N is non-modal (i.e., containing no occurrences of
modal operators) then either M or N is itself a theorem. In this section we
show that Zolin’s characterization is also equivalent to an even simpler one
that is closer in spirit to the motivating remarks in [5]: every theorem is a
tautological consequence of a fully modalized theorem. (Thus the theorems
can be divided into two categories—the essentially nonmodal ones, i.e., the
tautologies, and the essentially modal ones, i.e., the non-tautologies that are
tautological consquences of fully modalized theorems).
We begin by restating Zolin’s definition in our own terminology. If
p1, . . ., pn are sentence letters, then a state description in p1, . . ., pn is a
conjunction p∗1 ∧ . . . ∧ p∗n, where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, p∗i is either pi or ¬pi. The
(truth-functional) constituents of a formula A are the sentence-letters and
2-formulas occurring in A that do not properly occur within the scope of
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3any 2. Zolin observes that every formula A can be “decomposed” into a
formula of the form
∨{(~p ∧ B(~p)) : ~p is a state description in the sentence
letter constituents of A}, where, for each ~p , B(~p) is some truth functional
combination of the modal constituents of A. By fixing on a particular or-
dering of formulas and taking the B(~p)’s to be in a disjunctive normal form
that conforms to this ordering, we can single out a unique decomposition
of this kind. Let’s call it the Zolin form of A and let’s call the formulas
B(~p) that occur as right conjunct of a disjunct in the Zolin form of A, the
Zolin components of A. Note that every formula is truth-funtionally equiv-
alent to its Zolin form. Then, according to Zolin’s definition, a logic is fully
modalized if ` A implies ` B(~p) for every B(~p) that is a Zolin component
of A.
Theorem. A logic L is fully modalized (according to Zolin’s definition) iff
every theorem of L is a tautological consequence of a fully modalized theorem.
Proof. (Left to right). Suppose L satisfies Zolin’s definition and `L A.
Let (~p1 ∧ B(~p1)) ∨ . . . ∨ (~pn ∧ B(~pn)) be the Zolin form of A. Then, ac-
cording to Zolin’s definition, `L B(~pi) for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let A′ =
B(~p1)∧ . . .∧B(~pn). A′ is fully modalized and, since each of its conjuncts is
provable in L, A′ is as well. All that remains is to show that A is a truth-
functional consequence of A′. Let α be any assignment of truth values to the
constituents of A such that α |= A′. Let ~pα be the state description in the
sentence letters that are truth-functional constiuents of A that corresponds
to α in the sense that each conjunct of ~pα is the literal p or ¬p according
to whether α(p) is true or false. Then α verifies (~pα ∧ B(~pα)), which is a
disjunct of A and so α |= A as required.
(Right to left). We are given that every theorem of L is a tautological
consequence of some fully modalized theorem. Now suppose `L A and B(~p)
is a Zolin component of A, with a view towards showing `L B(~p). By
the initial suppositions, A is a truth-functional consequence of some fully
modalized formula A′. Then the Zolin form of A, call it (~p1 ∧ B(~p1)) ∨
. . . ∨ (pn ∧ B(~pn)), is also a truth functional consequence of A′, where for
some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, B(~pi) = B(~p). We show that B(~p) is provable in L by
showing that it is also a truth-functional consequence of the theorem A′.
To that end, let α be any assignment of truth values to the constituents of
A, such that α |= A′. Since A′ is fully modalized, its truth value under an
assignment is not affected by the truth assignments to sentence letters, so
we can assume without loss of generality that these conform to the state
description . Since the disjunction (~p1∧B(~p1))∨ . . .∨ (~pn∧B(~pn)) is a truth
functional consequence of A′, α must verify this disjunction. But ~p1, . . ., ~pn
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namely ∧B(~p). Hence α |= B(~p) as required. 
It is possible that there are applications for which Zolin’s more detailed
normal-form characterization of a fully modalized logic is more useful than
the simple characterization given here. But the proof below shows that
property that Humberstone extracts in [5] can be proved at least as easily
from our simple characterization.
Theorem. Suppose every theorem of L is a tautological consequence of a
fully modalized theorem. Then `L M ∨ N where M is fully modalized and
N is modality-free implies either `L M or `L N .
Proof. Assume the hypothesis of the claim and `L M∨N for appropriate M
and N . Then there is some fully modalized L-theorem A′ such that M ∨N
is a truth functional consequence of A′. Suppose for reductio that neither M
nor N is provable. Then neither M nor N is a truth functional consequence
of A′. So there is an assignment α of truth values to the constituents of A′
and M that makes the former true and the latter false. Similarly, there is
an assignment β to the constituents of A′ and N that makes A′ true and N
false. Now extend the assignment α to the sentence letters in N by assigning
them the same truth values as β does, and call the result α′. Since α′ agrees
with α on the modal constituents it verifies A′ and falsifies M . Since it
agrees with β on sentence letters, it falsifies N . This contradicts the earlier
observation that (M ∨N) is a truth functional consequence of A′. 
3 “Nothing in Between” and the Equivalence of
Modal Logics
The impetus for Section 4.4 of Humberstone’s book (304-324) is Arthur
Prior’s observation that the logical structure of moral concepts appears to
be unlike those of quantity and alethic modality:
In between “S must be P” and “S may be P” stands the simple
“S is in fact P”, just as “This S is P” stands in between “Every
S is P” and “Some S is P”. . . . But so far as I can see there
is nothing among the moral or ‘deontic’ modalities that corre-
sponds to these intermediary ‘existential’ or ‘alethic’ modalities.
([9] p145, quoted on 304 in [5].)
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5Early in the section,1 Humberstone notes that, in fact, there are strict logi-
cal intermediaries between “A is obligatory” and “A is permitted” or indeed
between any sentences A and B of decreasing logical strength in any reason-
ably well behaved modal logic, whether their connectives are given a deontic
reading or any other. For one can simply take as intermediary, any formula
A ∨ (B ∧ p) where p is a sentence letter that does not occur in A or B.
In this section we wish to point out that a consequence of this observation
is that there is a sense in which all modal logics meeting certain minimal
requirements are the same.
We identify a “logic” with a many-one deducibility relation on formulas
satisfying the usual structural conditions. (So the logic with all tautologies
as axioms and no rules of inference is distinct from a similar logic with modus
ponens as a rule of inference.) The minimal requirements are just that logics
are classically based and substitution-closed.2 By classically based we mean
that their languages contain the Boolean connectives or at least some truth-
functionally complete subset thereof) and that these behave classically under
the deducibility relation, so that, for example A ∧B ` C iff A ` (B → C).3
If a logic is classical, we may safely identify it with the set of its theorems,
knowing that these will determine the deducibility relation. By substitution-
closed we mean that A′1, . . ., A′n ` B′ whenever A′1, . . ., A′n and B′ are the
result of uniformly replacing sentence letters by formulas in A1, . . ., An and
B such that A1, . . ., An ` B. The requirement that the logic is classically
based ensures that A ∨ (B ∧ p) is a logical intermediary between A and
B. The requirement that it is substitution-closed implies that it is a strict
intermediary. For if it provably implied A, then its substitution instance
A∨(B∧B) would provably imply A, and A would be provably equivalent to
B. And if it was provably implied by B, then A∨(B∧A) would be provably
implied by B and again A would be equivalent to B. By saying that these
1(310). The intermediary here contains a sentence letter foreign to the boundary points.
The remainder of the Humberstone’s reflections on the matter ask whether this can be
avoided, and in particular whether a modal logic extending KD can be conservatively
extended so that A?B is a strict logical intermediary between A and B for some new
binary connective ? or so that #A is a strict intermediary between 2A and 3A for some
new unary connective #. The observations here concern only his simple initial observation.
2Note in particular that there is no requirement that the modal connectives be con-
gruential, so that the logic would be closed under replacement of provably equivalent
subformulas, and no restriction on the number or arity of such connectives.
3In the terminology of [4] (page 62), these logics are #-classical for every Boolean
connective #. [4] spells out necessary and sufficient conditions that are omitted here. The
term classical which might have been preferred over classically based is avoided because
classical modal logic is sometimes used for other purposes.
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translationally equivalent.4 Let us say that logics L1 and L2 are weakly
translationally equivalent if there is a map s : A 7→As from formulas of L1 to
formulas of L2 and a map t : C 7→Ct from formulas of L2 to formulas of L1
satisfying the following conditions (where `i is `Li for i = 1, 2):
(i) A1, . . ., An `1 B implies A1s, . . ., Ans `2 Bs
(ii) C1, . . ., Cm `2 D implies C1t, . . ., Cmt `1 Dt
(iii) A 1a 1`(As)t
(iv) C 2a 2` (Ct)s.
s and t are to be thought of as translations between the logics. If L1
and L2 are weakly translationally equivalent then the word implies in i
and ii can be strengthened to if and only if, so that s and t are faith-
ful embeddings. For example, by condition ii, A1
s, . . ., An
s `2 Bs implies
(A1
s)t, . . ., (An
s)t `1 (Bs)t, and so, by condition iii A1, . . ., An `1 B. But
the strengthened versions of i and ii still do not imply iii and iv. (See, for
example, [2] pp 111-124.) L1 and L2 are said to be translationally equivalent
if the translations securing their weak equivalence meet some additional re-
quirement,5 commonly that they be compositional, i.e., that they be maps
f such that for every n-ary connective # in the source language there is
formula schema σ of the target language with n schematic variables such
that f(#A1. . .An) = σ(f(A1), . . ., f(An)). If we are interested in what can
be said within a logic rather than the structure of the formulas saying it,
however, the restriction to compositional translations seems unwarranted. A
translation can be “sentence by sentence” rather than “symbol by symbol.”
It is plausible to take formulas to be saying the same thing in a logic when
they are provably equivalent. In that case the structure of the things that
can be said in a logic is given by its Lindenbaum lattice.6 By this, we mean
4A paradigm case is the relation between classical propositional logic formulated with
¬ and ∧ and that formulated with the Sheffer stroke. The notion has been defined in a
number of ways, which are nicely surveyed in chapter 5 of [2]. The definitions that follow
are close to those in [6]. Other definitions may diverge when certain Boolean connectives
are absent or fail to behave classically, but our emphasis here is on logics for which they
coincide.
5A surprisingly wide variety of other conditions on translations, not all intended to
feature in accounts of translational equivalence, appear in the literature. An extensive
taxonomy can be found in chapter 3 of [2]. Compositionality is required for translational
equivalence in, for example [8].
6The Lindenbaum algebra of a logic is generally taken to include operations correspond-
ing to every connective. As long as the logic is classical, operations corresponding to the
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[A]L of formulas A under the relation La L` and [A]L ≤ [B]L iff A ` LB.
In that case, we may say that two logics are the same with regards to what
they can say if their Lindenbaum lattices are isomorphic. It is not difficult
to show that under conditions of interest here, this condition coincides with
weak translational equivalence.
Theorem. (i) If L1 and L2 are weakly translationally equivalent then they
have isomorphic Lindenbaum lattices. (ii) If L1 and L2 are classically based
and they have isomorphic Lindenbaum lattices then they are weakly transla-
tionally equivalent.
Proof. Here and below, we drop the subscripts from the brackets and turn-
stile symbols, when the logic intended is clear. To prove i, suppose s
and t satisfy conditions i-iv defining weak translational equivalence. Let
Φ([A]) = [As]. We show that Φ is an isomorphism. i)Φ is well defined.
Suppose [A] = [B]. Then Aa`B. By condition i, this implies Asa`Bs.
Hence [As] = [Bs] and Φ([A]) = Φ([B]), as required. ii)Φ is 1-1. Sup-
pose Φ([A]) = Φ([B]). Then [As] = [Bs] and so Asa`Bs. By condition ii,
(As)ta`(Bs)t. By condition iii, Aa`B, and so [A] = [B], as required. iii)Φ
is onto. Take any C in the language of L2. By condition iv, Ca`(Ct)s.
Hence [C] = [(Ct)s]. Therefore [C] = Φ([Ct]), and [C] is in the range of Φ,
as required.
The proof of ii is facilitated by a lemma. Let us say that a translation
f : A 7→Af conforms to falsum if ⊥fa`⊥; to negation if (¬A)fa`¬Af ; to
conjunction if (A ∧ B)fa`Af ∧ Bf and similarly for all the other Boolean
connectives. To prove part ii of the theorem, we use only that s and t
conform to conjunction, but we take the opportunity to prove something
more general.
Lemma. Suppose s and t are translations securing the weak equivalence of
classically based modal logics L1 and L2. Then s and t conform to all the
Boolean connectives.
Proof. . Suppose s and t satisfy the hypothesis of the lemma. We show that
s and t conform to falsum (i) and the conditional (ii) and that it follows
that they conform to all the other Boolean connectives (iii).
(i) (We include the subscripts for clarity here.) Since L1 and L2 are
classically based, ⊥ `2 ⊥s and ⊥ `1 ⊥t. From the second of these it follows
Boolean connectives can be defined from relation ≤ in the lattice defined here, but the
notion singled out here is meant to exclude any operation corresponding to non-Boolean
connectives.
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8that ⊥s `2 (⊥t)s, and therefore that ⊥s `2 ⊥. Hence ⊥2a 2`⊥s and so s
conforms to ⊥. The proof that t conforms to ⊥ is similar.
(ii) Since L1 is classically based, (A → B), A ` B. By condition i of
weak translational equivalence (A → B)s, As ` Bs. Since L2 is classically
based, (A → B)s ` (As → Bs). Similarly, since L2 is classically based,
(A → B)t, At ` Bt. By condition (ii) of weak translational equivalence,
(As → Bs)t, (As)t ` (Bs)t. By condition iii, (As)ta`A and (Bs)ta`B, and so
(As → Bs)t, A ` B. Since L1 is classically based, (As → Bs)t ` A→ B. By
condition i, ((As → Bs)t)s ` (A → B)s, which implies by condition iv that
(As → Bs) ` (A→ B)s. We have now shown that (A→ B)sa`(As → Bs),
and so s conforms to →. The proof that t conforms to → is similar.
(iii) It can be shown that s and t conform to each of the remaining
Boolean connectives by expressing them in terms of falsum and the con-
ditional. For example (¬A)sa`(A → ⊥)s. Since s conforms to the condi-
tional and falsum, (¬A)sa`As → ⊥. Since the logics are classically based,
(¬A)sa`¬As. The other cases are similar. 
We proceed to the proof of part ii of the theorem. Suppose Φ is an
isomorphism between the Lindenbaum lattices (X1,≤1) and (X2,≤2) of L1
and L2. Let s map each formula A in the language of L1 to any member of
Φ([A]) and let t map each formula C in the language of L2 to any member
of Φ−1([C]). We show that s and t meet the four conditions for weak trans-
lational equivalence. For i, suppose A1, . . ., An ` B. Since L1 is classically
based A1 ∧ . . .∧An ` B, and so [A1 ∧ . . .∧An] ≤ [B]. Since Φ is an isomor-
phism, Φ([A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An]) ≤ Φ([B]), and so (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An)s ` Bs. Since s
conforms to conjunction, (A1
s∧. . .∧Ans) ` Bs. Since L2 is classically based,
A1
s, . . ., An
s ` Bs. The proof that condition ii is satisfied is similar. For
conditions iii and iv note that, since As ∈ Φ([A]), [As] = Φ([A]). Similarly,
[Ct] = Φ−1([Ct]). Together these two identities imply [(As)t] = Φ−1(Φ([A])
and [(Ct)s] = Φ(Φ−1[C]). It follows that [(As)t] = [A] and [(Ct)s] = [C] and
therefore that conditions iii and iv are satisfied. 
Since the modal logics under consideration are classically based, their
Lindenbaum lattices are Boolean algebras, i.e., we can define from ≤ op-
erations ∧,∨, and ¬ satisfying the usual Boolean axioms. Humberstone’s
observation that these logics provide strict intermediaries implies that they
are dense. Using X<Y to mean X ≤ Y and not Y ≤ X, we have that
[A]<[B] implies that there is some element [I] such that [A]<[I]<[B]. But a
Boolean algebra is dense iff it is atomless. (If the algebra is dense and 0<X
then there is is an element I, that precedes X, in the sense that 0<I<X, so
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an intermediary I between 0 and X, so if X<Y , X ∨ (I ∧ Y ) is an interme-
diary between X and Y .) A basic theorem of Boolean algebra states that
the theory of atomless Boolean algebras is ℵ0-categorical, i.e., that any two
countable atomless Boolean algebras are isomorphic.7It follows that any two
reasonably well-behaved modal logics are weakly translationally equivalent.
There is a sense in which adding 2 or any other non-Boolean connectives
to the language of propositional logic and axioms and rules of derivation to
the usual rules for classical logic adds nothing to what can be said. This
observation contrasts starkly with what happens when translations are re-
quired to be compositional. In [8], it is shown that if well-behaved modal
logics L1 and L2 are are translationally equivalent, then, for any number
n, the number of Kripke frames with n worlds validating L1 is the same
as the number validating L2. It follows if two logics have the finite frame
property (as all the most familiar modal logics do) and one is a sublogic
of the other, they cannot be translationally equivalent. The observation
here demonstrates the importance for the Pelletier/Urquhart result of the
requirement that the translations be compositional.
We do know that the translations between classically based modal logics
conform to the Boolean connectives. This allows us to sharpen the result
slightly in the direction of Pelletier/Urquhart.
Theorem. Suppose L1 and L2 are classically based modal logics. Then L1
and L2 are weakly translationally equivalent by way of translations s
∗ and
t∗ that preserve the Boolean connectives.
Proof. Since the logics are classically based they have isomorphic Linden-
baum lattices. By the previous theorem they are weakly translationally
equivalent. Let s and t be the translations securing this similarity. We
define s∗ and t∗ by cases:
(i) s∗(A) = As if A is a sentence letter or A = #A1. . .An for # an n-ary
non-Boolean connective
(ii) s∗(⊥) = ⊥
(iii) s∗(¬A) = ¬As∗
(iv) s∗(A#B) = As∗#Bs∗ if # is ∧,∨,→ or ↔.
The clauses for t∗ are similar.
7A proof can be found in Chapter 16 of the textbook [3].
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Induction using sentence letters and formulas #A1. . .An for # non-
Boolean as a base and appeal to the conformity property establishes that
s∗(A)a`As and t∗(C)a`Ct. It follows that s∗ and t∗, which preserve the
Boolean connectives, also satisfy the conditions for weak translational equiv-
alence. 
Note, however, that the result of [8] ensures that s∗ and t∗ are not in
general compositional. So one should not presume, for example, that the
s∗-translation of 2(p ∧ q) is any function of the s∗ translations of p and q.
4 S4⊕5′ = S4⊕F
Consider the following two axioms:
5′: (p ∧ ¬2p ∧2(p ∨2(p→ 2p)))→ 2¬2p
F: (p ∧32q)→ 2(3p ∨ q)
These emerge in Humberstone’s survey (402-420) of the logical terrain be-
tween S4 and S5 for plausible epistemic logics. F figures prominently in
[10] and 5′ in [12]. Humberstone (410) asks whether it is possible to derive
F from S4 and 5′. The point of this section is to argue that it is. We’ll also
show something that is already clear in Humberstone’s text, which is that
5′ can be proven in S4F, so S4F = S45′. Humberstone in fact shows some-
thing considerably stronger, namely that S4F is complete with respect to
the class of transitive, reflexive, semi-Euclidean frames, and 5′ is sound with
respect to the class of those frames. (The semi-Euclidean frames are those
which satisfy ∀xyz((xRy∧xRz)→ (yRz∨ zRx)). The term semi-Euclidean
is taken from [12].) From these results it follows there must be some proof
of 5′ in S4F. But the status of F in S45′ was an open question.
It will be convenient to label three additional formulas that appear in
the course of our derivation of F:
5′′ : (p ∧3¬p ∧32p)→ 3(¬p ∧3(p ∧ ¬2p))
A: (3p ∨2q) ∧3¬(3p ∨2q) ∧32(3p ∨2q)
B: ¬(3p ∨2q) ∧3((3p ∨2q) ∧ ¬2(3p ∨2q))
We will show the following:
Theorem.
(i) 5′ Ka`K 5′′
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(ii) `KT4 ¬F→ A
(iii) `5′′ A→ 3B
(iv) `S4 ¬3B
i allows us to work within S45′′ rather than S45′, and ii, iii, iv constitute a
reductio proof of F within that system. It should be noted that Humberstone
uses 5′ as a label for the schema corresponding to the axiom given here. We
work within a natural deduction system that allows us to use K, T, 4 and
propositional logic under assumptions, and to apply rules of necessitation
and uniform substitution to formulas that are not under any assumptions.
Proof. To prove i we note the following chain of K-equivalent formulas:
1. (p ∧ ¬2p ∧2(p ∨2(p→ 2p)))→ 2¬2p (=5′)
2. (p ∧ ¬2p ∧ ¬2¬2p)→ ¬2(p ∨2(p→ 2p))
3. (p ∧3¬p ∧32p)→ 3¬(p ∨2(p→ 2p))
4. (p ∧3¬p ∧32p)→ 3(¬p ∧ ¬2(p→ 2p))
5. (p ∧3¬p ∧32p)→ 3(¬p ∧3(p ∧ ¬2p)) (=5′′)
A derivation sketch establishing ii is given below. We make free use of
K and truth functional logic, but we note steps that use T or 4.
1. ¬((p ∧32q)→ 2(3p ∨ q)) (Assumption ¬F)
2. p (from 1)
3. 3p ∨2q (from 2 using T)
4. 3(¬3p ∧ ¬q) (from 1)
5. 3(¬3p ∧ ¬2q) (from 4 using T)
6. 3¬(3p ∨2q) (from 5)
7. 32q (from 1)
8. 322q (from 7 using 4)
9. 32(3p ∨2q) (from 8)
10. (3p ∨2q) ∧3¬(3p ∨2q) ∧32(3p ∨2q) (from 3,6,9)
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11. ¬F→ A (from 1-10)
For iii note that a substitution of 3p ∨ 2q for p in 5′′ results in the
formula A→ 3B. Finally, we establish iv by the derivation sketch below.
1. ¬(3p ∨2q) ∧3((3p ∨2q) ∧ ¬2(3p ∨2q))
(Assumption B)
2. ¬(3p ∨2q) (from 1)
3. 2¬p (from 2)
4. 22¬p (from 3 using 4)
5. 3((3p ∨2q) ∧ ¬2(3p ∨2q)) (from 1)
6. 3(2¬p ∧ (3p ∨2q) ∧ ¬2(3p ∨2q)) (from 4,5)
7. 3(2¬p ∧2q ∧ ¬2(3p ∨2q)) (from 6)
8. 3(2¬p ∧22q ∧ ¬2(3p ∨2q)) (from 7 using 4)
9. 3(2¬p ∧22q ∧ ¬22q) (from 8)
10. ¬B (from 1-9 by reductio)
11. 2¬B (from 10 by necessitation)
12. ¬3B (from 11)

As we mentioned above, Humberstone shows that there must be a proof
of 5′ in S4F. For the sake of symmetry, we sketch that proof. As it turns out,
only KTF is required, which we could not have known from Humberstone’s
completeness result.
1. (p ∧32q)→ 2(3p ∨ q) (F)
2. (¬(p→ 2p) ∧32p)→ 2(3¬(p→ 2p) ∨ p) (from 1 by substitution)
3. ¬((p ∧ ¬2p ∧2(p ∨2(p→ 2p)))→ 2¬2p) (Assumption ¬5′)
4. p ∧ ¬2p ∧2(p ∨2(p→ 2p)) ∧32p (from 3)
5. ¬(p→ 2p) ∧32p (from 4)
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6. 2(3¬(p→ 2p) ∨ p) (from 2,5)
7. 3¬p (from 4)
8. 3(¬p ∧ (3¬(p→ 2p) ∨ p)) (from 6,7)
9. 3(¬p ∧3¬(p→ 2p)) (from 8)
10. 2(p ∨2(p→ 2p)) (from 4)
11. 3(¬(p ∨2(p→ 2p)) ∧ (p ∨2(p→ 2p)) (from 9, 10)
12. 5′ (from 3-11 by T and reductio)

5 Ain’t Necessarily So
Humberstone’s “logic of coming about” (452-469) adds to the language of
classical sentential logic a modal operator D. DA is to be read as it comes
about that A and understood as being something like Nuel Belnap’s a sees to
it that A, except that it abstracts from the idea of agency. Models are triples
〈U, f, V 〉 where U and V are sets and valuations of the kind familiar from
modal logic and f is a unary function from U to U . The truth definition
has the usual clauses for the classical connectives and the additional clause:
〈U, f, V 〉 |=x DA iff 〈U, f, V〉 |=x A and not 〈U, f, V〉 |=f(x) A.
Truth in the model is truth at all u∈U , and validity is is truth in all mod-
els. Among the valid schemas and validity-preserving rules that he draws
attention to are the following:
D0: Substitution instances of tautologies
D1: DA→ A
D2: (A ∧DB)→ D(A ∧B)
D3: D(A ∧B)→ (DA ∨DB)
MP: A→ B,A / B
RDm,n: (B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bm)→ (A1 ∨ . . . ∨An) /
(B1∧ . . .∧Bm)→ ((DA1∧ . . .∧DAn)→ (DB1∨ . . .∨DBm))
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The last rule schema is intended to include the cases m = 0 and n = 0
with the usual stipulation that an empty conjunction is > and an empty
disjunction is ⊥. The reader is asked to show that D2 and D3 are provable
from the remaining schemas as an exercise and the valid formulas are then
shown to be axiomatized by D0, D1, MP and all the RD rules. In this
section we consider two additional schemas.
D4: (DA ∧DB)→ D(A ∨B)
D5:¬D>
We show that the valid formulas of coming-about logic are axiomatized
by D0, D1, D3, D4, D5 MP and RD1,1. Since we can always add a rule
of substitution while replacing the schematic variables in D1, D3, D4 by
sentence letters and replacing D0 by a finite set of axioms for sentential
logic, this shows that Humberstone’s infinite axiomatization can be replaced
by a simple finite one.
D4 plays a special role among the axioms and rules considered. Suppose
DA is interpreted as it is contingently true that A (or, as the section head
suggests, that A, while true, is not necessarily so). More precisely, replace
the function f in Humberstone’s models by an accessibility of the usual kind
and his truth clause for D by the following8:
CT: 〈U,R, V〉 |=x DA iff 〈U,R, V〉 |=x A and, for some y such that
xRy, not 〈U,R, V〉 |=y A
It is easy to check that D0, D1, D2, D3 and D5 all remain valid and
MP and RD1,1 still preserve validity. But when R is not a function then
D4 can be falsified: Let U = {w, u, v}, R = {(w, u), (w, v)}, V (p) = {w, u}
and V (q) = {w, v}. So D4 is independent of the five axioms and two rules
just given. In fact, as we shall show, these axioms and rules are sufficient to
axiomatize the contingently true operator under the interpretation CT.
First, however, we turn to the connection between the formula schemas
and the rule schema RDm,n and the proof that the logic of coming about is
finitely axiomatizable. Note that any logic containing D0 and closed under
8As it turns out, operators with this truth condition and its negation have already
attracted interest as ◦ and • in logics of accident and essence. See, for example, [7], [11],
and [1]. These are closely related to the operators 5 and 4 in an even larger literature
(to which Humberstone himself is an important contributor) on logics of contingency and
non-contingency. It is not difficult to see that the axiom systems AxK of [7], BK of [11]
and K° of [1] are all equivalent to the system for contingently true given here, and indeed
K° is essentially the same system.
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MP is closed under truth-functional consequence (TFC). This facilitates the
proof of the following:
Claim. In the presence of D0, D1 and MP: D2 is provable from RD1,1, D3
is provable from RD2,1, D4 is provable from RD1,2 and D5 is provable from
RD0,1
Proof. The required derivations are sketched below.
1. (A ∧B)→ B by D0
2. (A ∧B)→ (DB → D(A ∧B)) from 1 by RD1,1
3. (A ∧B ∧DB)→ D(A ∧B)) from 2 by TFC
4. (A ∧DB)→ D(A ∧B)) from 3 and D1 by TFC
1. (A ∧B)→ (A ∧B) by D0
2. (A ∧B)→ (D(A ∧B)→ (DA ∨DB)) from 1 by RD2,1
3. D(A ∧B)→ (DA ∨DB) from 2 and D1 by TFC
1. (A ∧B)→ (A ∨B) by D0
2. (A ∧B)→ ((DA ∧DB)→ D(A ∨B)) from 1 by RD1,2
3. D(A ∧B)→ D(A ∨B) from 2 and D1 by TFC
1. > → > by D0
2. > → (D> → ⊥) from 1 by RD0,1
3. ¬D> from 2 by TFC

Since Humberstone has already shown that D0 and D1 are valid and that
modus ponens and every instance of RDm,n preserves validity, the claim is
sufficient to show that our new axiom system is sound. To prove sufficiency,
it is sufficient to show that, for all m,n≥ 0, RDm,n is derivable in the new
system. To this end, notice first that D3 and D4 generalize, i.e., if ` indicates
provability in the new axiom system then:
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D3*: For all n≥1,` D(A1 ∧ . . . ∧An)→ (DA1 ∨ . . . ∨DAn), and
D4*: For all n≥1,` (DA1 ∧ . . . ∧DAn)→ D(A1 ∨ . . . ∨An).
For these claims to be sensible without grouping conjuncts and disjuncts our
logic must allow replacement of truth-functional equivalents. Humberstone’s
proof (453) of the claim that his logic satisfies the stronger property of being
“congruential,” i.e., closed under replacement of provable equivalents uses
only D0 and RD1,1 so we can help ourselves to this result. The claims can
then be proved by induction on n. In each case the basis case follows from
D0. The inductive step for D3* uses D3 and that for D4* uses D4.
This allows us to show that RDm,n is derivable for all positive m and n:
Suppose ` (B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bm)→ (A1 ∨ . . . ∨An). Then by RD1,1,
` (B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bm)→ (D(A1 ∨ . . . ∨An)→ D(B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bm)). By D3* and
TFC, ` (B1∧ . . .∧Bm)→ (D(A1∨ . . .∨An)→ (DB1∨ . . .∨DBm)). By D4*
and TFC, ` (B1 ∧ . . .∧Bm)→ ((DA1 ∧ . . .∧DAn)→ (DB1 ∨ . . .∨DBm)).
It remains only to check the cases m=0 and n=0. But for all m, RDm,0
is a consequence of TFC: if (B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bm) → ⊥ is provable then so is
any formula with B1 ∧ . . .∧Bm as antecedent, including the consequence of
RDm,0.
For the case m = 0 we will need D4* and D5. Suppose ` > → (A1 ∨
. . . ∨ An). Then (A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An) is provably equivalent to >. Since ` ¬D>
and our logic is congruential it follows that ` ¬D(A1 ∨ . . . ∨ An). By D4,
` ¬(DA1 ∧ . . .∧DAn). By TFC, ` > → ((DA1 ∧ . . .∧DAn)→ ⊥), and so
RD0,n is derivable.
Our proof that Humberstone’s logic of coming about has a simple, finite
axiomatization is complete and so we turn our attention to the axiomatiza-
tion of the logic of contingent truth.
Theorem. The axioms D0, D1, D3, D4, D5 and rules MP and RD1,1 pro-
vide a complete axiomatization of the logic of contingently true under the
interpretation CT.
Proof. Soundness was observed above so it is sufficient to prove sufficiency.
This can be done by constructing a canonical model out of maximally con-
sistent sets in a familiar way. Let M c = (W c, Rc, V c), where W c is the set
of all maximally consistent formulas, V c(p) = {w∈W c : p∈w}, and xRcy iff
A∈y whenever both A∈x and DA/∈x.
Lemma (Witness lemma). If DA∈x then ∃y(xRcy and ¬A∈y).
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:1) 2018, Article no. 1
17
Proof. Suppose DA∈x and let y− = {B: B∈x and DB 6∈x} ∪ {¬A}. Then
y− is consistent. For otherwise either ` A or there are formulas B1, . . ., Bn
such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,Bi∈x and DBi 6∈x and ` B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn → A.
In the first case, by D0, ` A↔>. Since the logic is congruential, ` D>,
violating D5. So we may assume that the second case obtains. By RD1,1,
` B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn → (DA → D(B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn)). Each Bi is a member of x
by construction and DA is a member of x by supposition, so it follows that
D(B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bn)∈x. By D3* this implies DB1 ∨ . . . ∨DBn ∈ x. But by
construction none of the formulas DBi is a member of x, so we have reached
a contradiction. Thus y− is consistent as claimed. By Lindenbaum’s lemma,
it can be extended to a maximal consistent set y satisfying the conditions
of the lemma. 
Lemma (Truth Lemma). In the canonical model for our logic, |=x A iff
A∈x.
Proof. By induction on A. We consider the case A = DB. First suppose
|=x A. By the truth definition, |=x B and ∃y(xRcy and 2yB). By induction
hypothesis, B∈x and ∃y(xRcy and B/∈y). By the definition of Rc, DB∈x
as required.
For the converse, suppose A∈x. By the witness lemma, ∃y(xRcy and
B∈y). By induction hypothesis, ∃y(xRcy and |=yB). Furthermore, since
A∈x, D1 implies that B∈x, and,by induction hypothesis, this implies that
|=x B. So, by the truth definition, |=x A, as required. 
To prove the theorem note that, by Lindenbaum’s lemma, any consistent
set in the logic described can be extended to a maximal consistent set, which
will be one of the worlds in the canonical model. By the truth lemma, all
the members of the set will be true at that world. 
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